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Introduction
We explore the transition from paid work to self-employment using three explanatory 
variables: paid income, predicted income, and income for ability. We find no linear relationship 
between the three variables and the self-employment transition. We then test for curvilinear 
relationships. We find that individuals with low incomes are more likely to take up self- 
employment. Further, income for ability is the strongest predictor of the transition to self-
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employment. The relationship between ability and self-employment is U shaped: very low ability 
and very high ability individuals are more likely to take up self-employment.
The decision by individuals to take up self-employment is one of the first steps that leads 
to the creation of many new firms, products, and services, and it is one of the two routes for the 
entrepreneurial process to proceed towards outcomes such as innovation and societal value 
creation, the other being corporate venturing. Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) argue that “while 
self-employment does not always generate new organizations, it is one important mechanism by 
which new organizations arise. Thus, organization theory may profit indirectly from future 
research in this area” (1987: p. 587). According to Shaver and Scott (1991), several pre-firm 
events contribute to the creation of new organizations. They explain the relevance of the 
different “events” as follows:
“We agree that the actual founding of an organization is a discontinuous 
change, but do not believe that it is the only “event” to be explained. Nor is it 
likely that the founders of new business organizations would agree that they 
have done only one thing. Rather, founders would probably agree that they 
have done many things in order to get to the final one. Thus we believe that 
the discontinuous creation of a new venture is preceded by a series of prior 
discontinuous events, each of which can be considered a separate “outcome”” 
(1991:34).
We understand the transition from paid employment to self-employment to be one such 
discontinuous event, and study how it is influenced by income in paid work. Income in paid 
work has been used as a proxy for the opportunity cost of self-employment. Amit, Glosten and 
Muller (1993) pinpoint opportunity cost as an important gap in our understanding of self- 
employment.
“We do not have models that examine the influence of opportunity costs on 
the willingness of would-be entrepreneurs to embark on highly uncertain 
projects. Ceteris paribus, it can be conjectured that equally able individuals 
with low opportunity costs are more likely to accept entrepreneurial projects.
(This may perhaps, explain why relatively few MBAs are attracted to starting 
their careers as entrepreneurs. It means giving up a high salary)” (1993: 818).
We argue that although prior research has found a negative relationship between income 
in paid work and the likelihood of a transition to self-employment, there are equally strong 
theoretical arguments in favor of a positive relationship and a U-shaped relationship. We find 
this dissonance between theory and tiie findings to date to be puzzling, and attempt to get to the 
bottom of this dissonance. Thus, the objective of this paper is to understand whether income in 
paid work is an endogenous variable in the transition to self-employment, and whether there 
might be a lower level predictor (that is, an exogenous variable) that would affect the parametric 
estimates of paid income as a predictor of this transition.
Section I briefly reviews the literature on the factors influencing the self-employment 
decision and formulates the hypotheses. Section II gives an overview of the methods and data 
source, defines the variables chosen and outlines the regression models. Section III presents the 
results, and Section IV summarizes the conclusions.
1. Literature review and theoretical arguments
Many scholars have written on the likelihood of an individual’s transition to self- 
employment using as explanatory variables income in paid work, human capital variables, age, 
race, and sex. Amit, Muller and Cockbum (1995), using data from the Canadian Labor Market 
Survey (LMAS), found support for the hypothesis that the lower a person’s opportunity cost 
(defined as wage earnings in the period immediately prior to the self-employment decision), the 
more likely she is to take up self-employment. Consistent with the finding of Amit et. al. (1995), 
Evans and Leighton (1989) reported from their study based on the National Longitudinal Study 
of Young Men (NLS) and the Current Population Surveys that lower paid wage workers are 
more likely to enter self-employment. Boijas and Bronars (1989) found that the self-employed 
are more likely to be college educated, a finding consistent with that of Rees and Shah (1986), 
which was based on data from the UK. Knudsen and McTavish (1989) also concluded that more 
educated individuals are more likely to take up self-employment.
We attempt to delve deeper into the positive relationship observed between self- 
employment and education, and the negative relationship observed between self-employment 
and income. In particular, we argue that theoretical arguments can be made in favor of a U- 
shaped relationship between income and self-employment, supporting both a negative 
relationship for low income individuals and a positive relationship for high income individuals.
A. Negative relationship between paid income and the self-employment decision
To support a negative relationship, one could say that the decision to take up self- 
employment on a frill time basis is a decision of considerable magnitude for those who are in 
paid employment. It requires sacrificing current income based on expectations of fixture income 
in the new career. A rational actor model would postulate that a paid worker analyzes all possible 
career alternatives, the payoffs of each alternative over time, and chooses that alternative whose 
net present value, weighted by the probability of its occurrence, is the highest. However, a 
complete list of career states, their probabilities, and their corresponding payoffs is not readily 
available to any paid worker. Even if this information were available, the costs for the worker of 
obtaining all the information and her limited computational ability would lead to her behaving in 
a boundedly rational way (Simon, 1955). Current income in paid employment is immediately 
available information that is a reasonable surrogate variable for the opportunity cost of becoming 
self-employed (see Amit, Muller, Cockbum, 1995: 97). Income in paid work is therefore the 
reservation wage against which the option of becoming self-employed is evaluated. Inertial 
forces favor the status quo, and paid employment is no exception. Prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) also provides support for this position by proposing that individuals are risk 
averse over gains, which means that an individual in paid work is more likely to overweight the 
prospect of sacrificing current income relative to foregoing a higher future income in self- 
employment. This phenomenon has also been referred to as the “endowment effect” (Knetsch 
and Sinden, 1984).
B. Positive relationship between paid income and the self-employment decision
On the other hand, several equally strong arguments can be put forward in favor of a 
positive relationship between paid income and the likelihood of self-employment. First, it can be 
argued that higher income individuals will see more valuable opportunities than lower income 
individuals, based on the finding that prior knowledge influences the quality of opportunities
recognized; Shane (2000) found that prior knowledge is an important factor in determining the 
opportunities that different individuals will recognize and pursue. High-income individuals, who 
possess higher value knowledge, may perceive the expected value of their self-employment 
opportunities to be higher than the expected value of continuing in paid employment. Second, 
higher income individuals are more likely to have accumulated higher levels of wealth during 
their careers. This higher wealth could provide protection against possible downside losses in 
self-employment. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) found that capital market imperfections mean that 
the wealthy are more likely to take up self-employment. Bates (1997) found that one reason for 
the lower rates of self-employment entry for blacks relative to whites is their lower wealth 
holdings. Third, Blau (1987) suggested that higher marginal tax rates could be a key determinant 
for the self-employment decisions of high income individuals, because self-employment makes it 
easier to under-report income relative to paid work.
C. U-shaped relationship between paid work and self-employment
A third possibility could simply be that low and high income individuals are more likely 
than middle income individuals to make the self-employment transition. This would mean that 
both sets of arguments provided above are right, and that their impact is felt at two different ends 
of the income distribution.
In true exploratory fashion, we formulate three hypotheses based on the above discussion 
of the relationship between paid income and the transition to self-employment.
Hypothesis 1: The probability o f a transition from paid work to self-employment is 
negatively related to income in paid work.
Hypothesis 2: The probability o f a transition from paid work to self-employment is 
positively related to income in paid work
Hypothesis 3: Individuals with low and high incomes in paid work are more likely than 
individuals with middle incomes to make the transition from paid work to self-employment.
As akeady stated, the above discussion does nothing to disentangle the income effect on 
self-employment, which has been found to be negative (Amit, Cockbum, and Muller, 1995; 
Evans and Leighton, 1989) from the education effect, which has been found to be positive 
(Boijas and Bronars, 1989; Rees and Shah, 1986).
We find it puzzling that the relationship between paid income and the probability of self- 
employment has been found to be negative rather than U-shaped. There are two possible 
explanations for this. The first is that there are too few data points at high incomes, and this is 
biasing the parametric estimates to reflect the transitions at low and medium incomes. The other 
is that it is not income per se that matters, but the degree of dissatisfaction with it. Individuals at 
low and high incomes levels could be dissatisfied with their incomes for different reasons. This 
implies that income in paid work is an endogenous variable in the self-employment transition 
model. We take up this discussion next.
D. The role of ability in the self-employment decision
Previous studies based on human capital (education, job tenure and labor market 
experience), demographic (race and sex), and locational variables (industry, occupation, and 
state of residence) have been able to explain variation in paid income across individuals only 
partially. It has been hypothesized that this unexplained variance could be partly attributed to
individual characteristics such as the ability to get things done, energy levels, the ability to get 
along with people, motivation, commitment etc (see for example. Card, 1995a, 1999; Card and 
Lemieux, 2000). All these different characteristics, which are not captured by human capital 
variables, can be grouped under one general heading: ability. According to Behrman and 
Rosenzweig (1999), “ability has been used as the rubric for all unmeasured eamings 
endowments, which may include genetic endowments of ability, pre-school human capital 
investment, or motivation.”
The focus to date of the research on ability has been on how to obtain accurate parametric 
estimates of the returns to education. The difficulty lies in separating the actual returns to 
education from the returns to innate abilities that are independent of education. It is recognized 
that education may be an endogenous variable with ability determining the amount of education 
related investment an individual will make. There are those who suggest that education may 
serve a function beyond that of productivity enhancement, as is suggested by human capital 
theory (Becker, 1993; Mincer, 1962; Schultz, 1961): it may serve as a signaling mechanism of an 
individual’s ability (Spence, 1974). Thus, the ability variable may permit us to explore a lower 
level explanation for the probability of a transition to self-employment, and may provide more 
accurate parametric estimates of paid income and education as predictors of the self-employment 
transition.
Blackburn and Neumark (1995) outline two measures that have been used for ability: 
first, explicit measures such as IQ test scores and parents’ education have been used as proxies 
for ability. Second, data from identical (monozygotic) twins have been used to control for the 
ability factor. The conclusion one can draw from a review of the literature is that the concept of 
ability is of great theoretical importance, but no fully satisfactory method has yet been found of 
measuring it.
We offer a different approach to the ones that have been used so far for measuring ability, 
one that benefits from the fact that income estimation is not our primary research interest in this 
paper. We hypothesize that an individual’s income in paid work can be explained by four broad 
constructs: first, human capital, which is made up of education, employment tenure, and labor 
market experience; second, demographic variables, based on the well-documented income 
penalties suffered in the US by non-whites and females; third, location variables, made up of 
occupation, industry, and state of residence; and fourth, innate abilities. Our model can therefore 
be written as
I = a + piH + P2D + PsL + P4A + s,
where I is income in paid employment, H is a vector of human capital variables, D is a vector of 
demographic variables, L is a vector of location variables, A is the ability measure, and s is an 
error term uncorrelated with I. We assume that the market is efficient in rewarding the worker’s 
productivity. Therefore, if all the variables except Ability are controlled for, then the residual 
(Income-Income’) should contain income for ability and the error term. We take this residual to 
be a rough measure of the market’s valuation of the ability of an individual. This residual can 
take both positive and negative values, reflecting an income premium for ability and an income 
penalty for the lack of it.
We recognize that there are problems with this measure. First, in predicting income, we 
have actually excluded ability, and thus all the parameter estimates could be biased. We offer a 
remedy to this problem by including a model with parents’ education as proxy variables for
ability; these variables have been used in the past to control for ability (for example. Card, 
1995b). The reader will note that there is not much difference in the parameter estimates between 
the two models. Second, we are unable to separate the error term from income for ability. While 
these difficulties are real, our position is that we are merely proposing that the residiial be 
considered a rough measure of the market’s valuation of an individual’s ability.
We hypothesize that individuals with very low ability are more likely to take up self- 
employment. These individuals may simply lack the discipline to work under someone else’s 
authority, or in teams, and may consequently be poorly rewarded. They may compare their low 
positions in their organizations and their low remunerations with those of higher ability 
individuals with similar human capital, and feel frustrated at the difference. They would thus be 
tempted to strike it out on their own. On the other hand, individuals with very high ability are 
those with high energy levels, who have the ability to get things done, who have strong 
interpersonal skills, and who are creative problem solvers. These individuals may feel that, in 
spite of their above average remunerations, they can do better on their own. This is because they 
have to share with their principals a substantial percentage of their marginal contributions to their 
organizations. Finally, individuals of average ability are likely to be compensated in line with 
their human capital -  they are therefore less likely to search for self-employment opportunities. 
Even if they come across one, they are likely to assign lower weights to the expected ftiture 
earnings from it relative to their current incomes in paid work (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Hypothesis 4: Low ability and high ability individuals are more likely than medium 
ability individuals to make the transition from paid work to self-employment.
II. Data, variables, and methods
We use data from the Survey Research Center (SRC) sample of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), a large longitudinal dataset at the Institute for Survey Research. The 
SRC is an equal probability sample that was initiated in 1968 with 3,000 famiUes, and the 
individuals in these families have been interviewed every year since then. We focus on heads of 
households because they are the family members about whom the greatest amount of information 
is available. We take eight pairs of years: 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990- 
91, 1991-92, and 1992-93. llie  first year of each pair is year 1, and the second is year 2. We take 
1985 as our starting point because some of the variables of our interest are not available for 
earlier years. When the data preparation for this research was concluded, 1993 was the last year 
for which full data was available.
A. Generalized Least Squares Regressions
We first run two Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression models with paid income 
as the dependent variable. In Model 1, we use education, tenure, labor market experience, race, 
sex, occupation, industry, and state of residence as the independent variables. We use seven 
dummy variables for the eight years. To ensure against the omitted variable bias, we add two 
more variables -  father’s education and mother’s education -  as proxy variables for ability m 
line with past practice (for example, Card, 1995). We then run Model 2, without the two 
variables for parents’ education. We present both models for the reader to see that there is not 
much difference in the parameter estimates between the two. We take the residual (Income -  
Income’) from Model 2 as a rough measure of income for ability, to be used in the logistic 
regression models (see Goldstein (1995) for the practice of using residuals in multi-stage 
regressions).
B. Logistic Regressions
We then run four logistic regression models for clustered data using Generalized 
Estimation Equations, with a binary dependent variable for year 2 employment status (self- 
employment=l, paid work=0). In year 1 of each pair, all subjects are exclusively in paid work. 
We use year 1 variables as predictors of the self-emplo)mient choice in year 2.
In Model 1 we use paid income as the explanatory variable. In model 2 we use the two 
components of paid income from the GLS regression: predicted income and the residual (which 
is our income for ability). In order to test for a curvilinear relationship between these variables 
and the probability of transiting to self-employment, we set up four dummy coded variables for 
each of the three variables (that is, twelve variables in all) to represent the quintiles of the paid 
income, predicted income, and income for ability variables. The middle quintile (41^  ^ to 60^  ^
percentile), is the default quintile in all three cases. In model 3 we use the paid income quintiles. 
In model 4 we use the predicted income and income for ability quintiles.
There was a problem of quasi-complete separation with some of the dummy variables for 
occupation and state of residence. These variables were dropped from the respective models.
Devendent variable (self-employment in year 2): This variable is coded as 0 if the 
individual continued in paid employment in year 2 , and 1 if the individual made the 
transition to self-employment. All individuals in year 1 were in full time paid-employment. 
Paid income: This is the total labor income of the individual. We use nominal incomes for 
multi-year data because we have 7 dummy variables for the eight years, which will control 
for all year specific effects, including inflation.
Income quintiles: We have four dummy coded variables for the five income quintiles. 
Quintile 3 (41-60* percentile) is taken as the reference variable, and we thus report 
parametric estimates for quintiles 1, 2, 4, and 5.
Predicted income: This is the predicted income from the GLS model which estimates paid 
income as a function of human capital, demographic, and locational variables. To protect 
against the omitted variable bias, we also use parents’ education as proxies for ability. 
Predicted income quintiles: To test for a non-linear relationship, we divide the predicted 
income residual into 5 quintiles, and obtain four dummy coded variables. The middle 
quintile (quintile 3) serves as our reference. Parametric estimates are reported for quintiles 
1,2,4, and 5.
Income for ability: As explained earlier, income for ability is the residual between the 
actual income and the predicted income that we get from the GLS regression.
Income for ability quintiles: To test for a non-linear relationship, we divide income for 
ability into 5 quintiles, and obtain four dummy coded variables. The middle quintile 
(quintile 3) serves as our reference. Parametric estimates are reported for quintiles 1, 2, 4, 
and 5.
Control variables: In addition to the above, we control for several other variables. Father’s 
education and mother’s education are two variables that are coded identically: from 0  to 8 
depending upon the levels of educational attainment of the parent. Unemployed hours is the 
total number of imemployed hours reported for year 1. Children is the number of children. 
Jobunion is dummy coded with a value of 1 if the paid job in year 1 was under union 
contract and 0 otherwise. Tenure is employment tenure in months. Labmktex is total full 
time labor market experience in years since the age of 18. Tenuresq and Labmktexsq are
quadratic expressions of tenure and labmktex respectively to control for positive but 
declining returns to these two attributes (Ben-Porath, 1967). Marital status is coded 1 if the 
subject was married or cohabiting with a partner, and 0 otherwise. Education is years of 
education, with the values 0-16 representing the actual years of schooling, and 17 
representing a maximum value for all graduate education. Thus the mean of the education 
variable is somewhat understated in the dataset. Age is given in years, and only 
observations in the range of 18-65 are considered. Race is coded 1 for whites and 0 
otherwise. Sex is coded 1 for females and 0 for males. Father’s occupation refers to the 
usual occupation of the subject’s father when the subject was growing up, and is coded 1 
for self-employed and 0 otherwise. We then include four sets of dummy variables: 11 
occupation variables for a total of 12 occupations at the 3-digit level; 7 year variables for a 
total of 8 years; 11 industry variables for a total of 12 industries at the 3 -digit level; and 51 
state variables for the 50 states. District of Columbia, and other territories like Virgin 
Islands, Puerto Rico, etc.
III. Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. The correlation matrix is given in Table 2; it 
reports bivariate correlations for descriptive purposes only — the correlations do not take into 
consideration the higher within-cluster correlations relative to the across-cluster correlations. The 
results of the GLS regression predicting income as a fimction of human capital, sex, race, 
occupation, industry, state of residence, and parents’ education are given in Table 3.
Table 4 gives the parametric estimates for the four logistic regression models. Model 1 
includes paid income quintiles and the other control variables. Paid income is not correlated to 
self-employment. The explanatory variables that are statistically significant predictors are 
whether the job is under union contract (negative). Tenure (negative). Education (positive), and 
Race (whites more likely to become self-employed). The number of unemployed hours is a 
marginally significant predictor.
Model 2 includes predicted income and income for ability in place of paid income. 
Again, neither of the two variables explains the self-employment choice. It is interesting to 
compare the education and race variables in models 1 and 2. While they are significant at the 
p<0.05 and p<0.01 level respectively in Model 1, they cease to be significant in Model 2. This is 
particularly interesting given the orthogonality of education to our income for ability measure.
Model 3 includes income quintiles, with the middle quintile (41^  ^ to 60* percentile) 
serving as the base case. The objective of introducing quintiles is to test for a curvilinear 
relationship between income and the self-employment decision. Individuals in income quintile 1 
are far more likely, and those in quintile 2  marginally more likely, to take up self-employment 
relative to those in quintile 3. The estimates for quintiles 4 and 5 are not statistically significant. 
Education and race are once again statistically significant predictors at the p<0.01 level.
Model 4 includes the predicted income and income for ability quintiles. Predicted income 
quintiles are not related to the self-emplo3anent decision. As far as income for ability is 
concerned, quintiles 1 and 5 are statistically significant predictors (at the p<0.01 level) of the 
transition to self-employment. Interestingly, education is again no longer significant in predicting 
self-employment. Race, on the other hand, is.
We find it interesting that in the two models in which predicted income and income for 
ability are introduced (Models 2 and 4) in place of paid income, education ceases to be a 
predictor of the self-emplojnnent decision. This could be because education is endogenous, and
controlling for ability makes the education effect disappear. The two variables that are 
consistently strong predictors of self-employment across all four models are whether the paid job 
is under union contract and employment tenure.
In summary, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported, in that there is no linear relationship, 
whether positive or negative, between income in paid work and the self-employment transition. 
Hypothesis 3 is partially supported, in that individuals in Quintile 1 are far more likely, and those 
in Quintile 2 are somewhat more likely, than those in Quintile 3 to take up self-employment. 
However, we could not establish that individuals in Quintiles 4 and 5 are more likely than those 
in Quintile 3 to take up self-employment.
Hypothesis 4 is clearly supported. People of very low and very high ability are more 
likely to take up self-employment than those of moderate ability. We hypothesize that low ability 
individuals are frustrated at their low incomes relative to their human capital. They may also be 
envious of individuals of similar human capital earning substantially more. People of very high 
ability are also more likely to take up self-employment, in spite of earning substantially more 
than the mean income for individuals with similar human capital. One possible explanation for 
this is that these very high ability individuals, in spite of being highly rewarded, may feel that 
they unnecessarily hand over a substantial percentage of their marginal contributions to their 
principals.
IV. Conclusions
Using panel data, we have shown that income for ability is a better predictor than paid 
income of the likelihood that a person will take up self-employment. We have used the residual 
derived from the difference between actual income and predicted income as a rough measure of 
ability. Individuals earning substantially below their expected incomes are considered low-ability 
individuals, whereas individuals earning substantially above their expected incomes are 
considered high ability individuals.
In contrast to the suggestion made by Rees and Shah (1986), we assume that success in 
self-employment does not require different skills from those required in paid work. Individuals 
who show high abilities in paid work believe that they can successfully transfer these abilities to 
self-employment. Although individuals with very high abilities receive considerable rewards in 
paid work, their compensation is by definition lower than their marginal product. Those 
individuals for whom the difference between their marginal product and their income is the 
greatest will be more likely to take up self-employment. Individuals with low abilities are 
penalized by the market, such that their earnings are considerably below what they should be 
given their human capital. We use prospect theory to explain why low and very high ability 
individuals are more likely to take up self-employment.
Our results are consistent with theories of entrepreneurship based on Austrian economics. 
For example, Shane (2000) posits that different individuals identify different opportunities based 
on their prior knowledge and experience. It can be argued that high ability individuals are more 
likely to be exposed to higher value opportunities, and this makes their transition to self- 
employment more likely. Our explanation is complementary to that of Shane (2000) in that we 
explain why a high ability individual might be more predisposed to identifying entrepreneurial 
opportunities.
Our results are also consistent with non-monetary explanations, such as the desire to take 
on the challenge of creating an economic institution, the desire for independence; it could be
10
argued that high ability individuals who earn high incomes are more likely to be motivated by 
objectives other than purely monetary ones.
Whether the income residual from the GLS regression can be considered an approximate 
measure of income for ability or not, our findings are significant in two ways: first, that very 
high and very low values of the residual are very strong predictors of the transition to self- 
employment; and second, when the income is replaced by predicted income and residual income, 
education ceases to be significant in predicting self-employment. These findings, at the very 
least, merit a closer examination by scholars in the future.
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Number of valid observations 
Number of clusters
Descriptive Statistics
18,860
3,908
Table 1
Categorical Variables:
Frequency of self-employed in year 2 
Job under union contract 
Marital Status (l=married or cohabiting) 
Race (l=white)
Sex (l=Female)
Father’s occupation (l=self-employed)
524 (Missing Values 370) 
3,955 (Missing Values 517) 
13,061 (Missing Values 0) 
17,013 (Missing Values 43) 
3,405 (Missing Values 0) 
673 (Missing Values 0)
Continuous Variables: Mean Std dev. Min Max
Paid income 30,428 23,251 0 550,000
Predicted income 29,837 12,281 -19,988 65,554
Income for ability 663.02* 19,347 -57,174 503,069
Unemployed Hours 45.21 187.10 0 2,080
Number of Children 0.98 1.14 0 7
Tenure (months) 99.44 100.65 0 564
Labor mkt experience (yrs) 13.85 10.33 0 47
Education (yrs) 13.39 2.35 3 17
* Note that the mean residual of a GLS regression can be non-zero.
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GLS Regression - GEE Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable = Paid Income
Parameter
Model 1 
Estimate
Model 2 
Estimate
Intercept
-27857.5*** -25934.6***
Tenure 67.1997*** 65.6643***
Tenure squared
-0.0431* -0.0367
Labor Market Experience 775.1564*** 689.5555***
Labor Market Experience squared
-18.7449*** -17.4498***
Education 3071.368*** 3168.512***
Race (white =1) 4607.615*** 4978.80***
Sex (female =1)
-7309.67*** -7157.63***
Father’s education 425.0745** —
Mother’s education 199.08642
In addition to the variables listed above, dummy variables were used 
to control for year, occupation, industry, and state of residence. The estimates 
of these parameters have not been reported.
*p<.10 
** p<.05
p<.01
Note: The GEE tool used (PROC GENMOD in SAS with REPEATED statement for subject id) 
does not report a model R .^ The simple correlation between the observed and the predicted 
values of the dependent variable is 0.5528 for Model 1 and 0.5558 for Model 2, and that between 
the dependent variable and the residual is 0.8499 for Model 1 and 0.8496 for Model 2. These 
correlations do not control for higher within cluster correlations.
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Logistic Regression - GEE Parameter Estimates
Dependent variable = Self-employed in year 2 (=1); Paid work in year 2 (=0)
Table 4
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 M odels Model 4
Intercept -6.7868*** -6.3328*** -7.5739*** -6.1446***
Paid income -0.0000
Paid Income Quintile 1 0.8521***
Paid Income Quintile 2 0.3222*
Paid Income Quintile 4 -0.1048
Paid Income Quintile 5 0.2838
Predicted income 0.0001
Predicted Income Quintile 1 0.0403
Predicted Income Quintile 2 0.0759
Predicted Income Quintile 4 0.0316
Predicted Income Quintile 5 0.4073
Income for ability -0.0000
Income for ability Quintile 1 0.9282***
Income for ability Quintile 2 0.1209
Income for ability Quintile 4 -0.0309
Income for ability Quintile 5 0.4968***
Hours unemployed 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0002
Children 0.0226 0.0230 0.0214 0.0350
Job under Union Contract (Yes=l) -0.7305*** -0.7315*** -0.6159*** -0.7064***
Tenure -0.0059*** -0.0070* -0.0052*** -0.0070***
Tenure squared 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000*
Labor Market Experience 0.0244 -0.0128 0.0318* 0.0081
Labor Market Experience squared -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0001
Marital Status (Married=l) -0.1295 -0.1287 -0.1213 -0.1369
Education in years 0.0802** 0.0271 0.0879*** 0.0073
Race (White=l) 0.5496*** 0.4655 0.6012*** 0.4134**
Sex (Female=l) -0.2178 -0.0979 -0.2723 -0.0706
Father's occupation (Self-employed=l) 0.3797 0.3816 0.3665 0.3288
The parameter estimates for occupation, year, industry, and state of residence have not been reported.
* p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01
Model Goodness of Fit Criteria
Deviance 4142.96 4142.84 4105.77 4081.54
Pearson chi-square 17936.06 17929.94 18184.91 18142.35
Log Likelihood -2071.48 -2071.42 -2052.88 -2040.77
